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SHOOTOUT AT THE ECJ CORRAL:  
MANAGEMENT 4, LABOR 0; EUROPEAN 
LABOR DISPUTE LAW AFTER VIKING LINE 
Carol Daugherty Rasnic
Hell hath no fury like a union scorned.1
INTRODUCTION
With an economy that is becoming increasingly globalized, an 
undergraduate labor law course must include at least minimal 
coverage of European Union (EU) law.  The usual perception of a 
union-friendly Europe has been surprisingly altered by four European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions in late 2007 and 2008.  Although 
this shift might be transitory if new directives revert to the prior 
secured rights of union members in Europe, it is a critical component 
of a labor law course for business students.     
These decisions began with International Transport Workers’ 
Federation v. Viking Line ABP (Viking),2 decided in December 2007, 
followed shortly thereafter by three similar defeats to union efforts to 
dictate management policies.3  The ire of labor unions, legal 
academics, and practitioners has provoked a flurry of activity at the 
European Commission level. 
 Professor of Law Emerita at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
The author is grateful to the School of Law at The University of Edinburgh 
for providing research support for this article through the Sir Neil 
MacCormick Fellowship. 
1 This is an adaptation of “Nor Hell a Fury, like a Woman scorn’d,” 
from William Congreve’s “The Mourning Bride.”  WILLIAM CONGREVE, The 
Mourning Bride act 3, sc. 1, l. 458, reprinted in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF 
WILLIAM CONGREVE 320, 361 (Herbert Davis et al. eds., Univ. Chicago Press 
1967) (1697). 
2 Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp.Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 
2007 E.C.R. I-10779. 
3 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767; Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. 
Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989; Case C-319/06, Comm’n v. 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2008 E.C.R. I-04323. 
354                                  SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF            [Vol. 9.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
This article explains some characteristics of domestic labor law 
in EU member states, the evolving nature of the EU, the four ECJ 
decisions, the primary bases for objections, and proposed changes in 
EU legislation.  Intermittent comparisons with counterpart U.S. 
federal law are used to draw distinctions between labor-management 
laws that confront the American company engaged in business within 
the EU.  
I. EUROPEAN DOMESTIC LABOR LAWS
Most European countries are social states, with workers 
normally entitled to numerous social benefits.4  For example, 
workers may benefit from unemployment compensation funded 
through taxes on the worker as well as his employer, much like social 
security in the United States.5  Additional social benefits include 
prolonged maternity and/or parental leaves, generally with pay.  The 
longest are in Spain (seventy-two months), Germany (thirty-nine and 
one half months), Finland (thirty-eight months), France (thirty-seven 
and one half months), Sweden (thirty-six and one half months), and 
Portugal (thirty-six months).6  Annual paid leave policies also tend to 
be generous:  four weeks in Great Britain,7 twenty-four working days 
in Germany,8 and thirty working days in Austria.9  In contrast, the 
U.S. Family & Medical Leave Act only provides a relatively short 
combined period of up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for qualified 
4 The term “social state” and “socialist state” are frequently confused.  
A social state is one that provides comprehensive social benefits through 
heavy taxation, whereas a socialist state is one controlled and owned, at least 
in part, by the government. 
5 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
6 Christopher J. Ruhm, Policies to Assist Parents with Young Children,
21 FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2011, at 37, 41 tbl.2.   
7 Working Time Regulations, 1998, S.I. 1998/1833, art. 2, ¶ 13 
(Gr.Brit.). 
8 Mindesturlaubsgesetz für Arbeitnehmer [BUrlG] [Minimum Leave 
Act for Employees], Jan. 8, 1963, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. I], last 
amended by Gesetz [G], May 11, 2002, BGBL. I §§ 1, 3 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/burlg/gesamt.pdf.  
9 URLAUBSGESETZ [HOLIDAYS ACT] July 7, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL I] No. 390/1976, § 2 ¶ 1 (Austria), available at http://www.ris. 
bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer
=10008376&ShowPrintPreview=True (mandating paid leave of thirty-six 
working days for a worker with twenty-five years of service). 
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workers for reasons including serious illness of the employee; serious 
illness of the employee’s close family member (parent, child, or 
spouse); and/or birth or adoption of a child.10
European workers also commonly have substantial statutory job 
protections.11 Domestic job protections throughout Europe are 
antithetical to American employment-at-will rules that prevail in 
many states.12  Statutory works councils are typical in European 
domestic law and an employer must consult with this body of elected 
workers prior to making many decisions normally reserved for 
management in the American workplace, such as termination or 
reassignment of a worker and determination of workplace rules.13
Trade unions in European countries differ from those in the 
United States in three major respects.  First, European countries do 
not have the usual public-private sector division.  Private sector 
unions in the United States are governed either by the 1926 Railway 
Labor Act,14 which applies to railway and airline workers, or the 
Taft–Hartley Act,15 covering all other industries and businesses in the 
private sector.  Federal workers are subject to the Civil Service 
Reform Act,16 and additional state statutes may apply to employees 
of the individual state governments. 
10 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (applying only to 
employers with at least fifty employees). 
11 See, e.g., Kündigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] [Employment Protection 
Act], Aug. 25, 1969, BGBL. I at 1317, last amended by G, Mar. 26, 2008, 
BGBL. I at 444 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/kschg/BJNR004990951.html#BJNR004990951BJNG000100311. 
12 See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the 
Employment Contract: Contrasting U.S. “Employment-at-Will” Rule with 
the Worker Statutory Protections Against Dismissal in European Community 
Countries, 4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 441 (1995). 
13 See, e.g., Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution 
Act], Sept. 25, 2001, BGBL. I at 2518, last amended by G, July 29, 2009, 
BGBL. I at 2424 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_betrvg/englisch_betrvg.html#p0052 (requiring a works council for 
companies with five or more employees). 
14 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006). 
15 Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 141–187 (2006). 
16 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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A second difference is the scope of what constitutes the 
employer in a collective bargaining agreement.  To be sure, there are 
multi-employer collective bargaining contracts in the United States, 
but the European concept is fundamentally different.  Unions in 
Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, and Sweden are organized at the industry level—all 
companies within a designated industry are covered by the same 
collective bargaining agreement.17  Other countries, such as Belgium 
and Romania, determine the content of union-employer contracts by 
statute.18
A third distinction is the saturation level of union membership in 
Europe.  A 2011 survey by the European Trade Union Institute 
(ETUI)19 stated that the percentage of union membership in the 
workforce varies from 98% in Austria and France to 15% in 
Lithuania, with a trans-European average of 66%.20  This contrasts 
starkly with U.S. figures, especially in the private sector, where 
union membership is estimated to be as low as 7.6%.21  Even in the 
more unionized public sector, the membership rate is still only 
40.7%.22  The message for an American company doing business in 
Europe is that it must be prepared to contend with strong organized 
labor. 
17 L. Fulton, European Trade Union Institute, Collective Bargaining,
WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU, http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-
Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
18 Id.
19 ETUI is the research and training center for the European Trade 
Union Confederation, a self-described umbrella association of all European 
trade unions.  About ETUI, EUR. TRADE UNION INST., http://www.etu 
i.org/About-Etui (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).   
20 Fulton, supra note 17. Belgium, Slovenia, Finland, Portugal, and 
Sweden all have union membership of 90% or higher, and the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Spain, Norway, Greece, Germany, and Luxembourg 
are between 60% and 90%.  Id. 
21 Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—
2011 app. at tbl.3 (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.rele 
ase/archives/union2_01272012.pdf.    
22 Id. (noting federal workers at 33.2%, state workers at 35%, and local 
government workers at 46.6%). 
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II. THE CHANGING FOCUS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The moving principal behind what now constitutes the European 
Union was French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who believed 
that any lasting peace in post-World War II Europe necessitated an 
economic treaty.23  The 1951 Treaty of Paris24 created the European 
Coal and Steel Community, a single authority over all French and 
German production in those industries.  The Treaty of Paris was 
augmented in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome,25 which created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and replaced the singular 
“community” with the plural “communities.”26  The EEC was 
authorized to achieve common agricultural, transport, and 
competition policies; to establish a customs tariff and common 
commercial policies with regard to external countries; and to 
implement a common market.27
The 1957 establishment of the first “pillar,” the economic 
community, was later expanded by the Treaty of Maastricht28 in 1992 
to include a second pillar on common foreign policy and security, 
and a third pillar on cooperation in the fields of “justice and home 
affairs.”29  These expansions reflect the increasing scope of 
governance by the Community’s institutions.  Subsequent treaties 
23 Eur. Comm’n, Robert Schuman: The Architect of the European 
Integration Project, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/founding-fathers/index_en.htm#box_9 (follow “Read more about 
Robert Schuman” hyperlink) (last visited on Feb. 22, 2013). 
 24 Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. The specific powers 
delegated to the Community can be found in Article 3 of the Treaty.  Id. at 
147.  However, the Community’s powers expired fifty years after the Treaty 
entered into force.  Id. at 227. 
25 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].  The Treaty of Rome 
subsumed and supplanted the Treaty of Paris in 2002. 
26 Compare the various articles of Treaty of Paris, supra note 25, with 
Treaty of Rome, supra note 26. 
27 Treaty of Rome, supra note 25.  For a discussion of the EEC’s 
original purpose, see JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 5–7 
(Pearson Educ. Ltd. ed., 8th ed. 2010). 
28 Treaty on European Union art. B, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 253. 
29 Id.
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adding to these social policies included the Treaty of Amsterdam30
which declared the Community to have been founded upon “the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights,”31 equality 
between the sexes, and improvement of the quality of the 
environment.32  The most recent document, the 2009 Treaty of 
Lisbon, entailed perhaps the most substantial expansion.33  Lisbon 
merged the three pillars, replaced references to “Communities” with 
“European Union,”34 and mandated that the EU “combat social 
exclusion and discrimination and . . . promote social justice.”35
These newly legislated EU social rights have generated a wealth of 
legal academic literature.36  What began in post-World War II Europe 
aimed at freeing the movement of goods, services, capital, and 
persons and dispensing with inter-country trade barriers, developed 
into a common market with economic free movement adding further 
to those original economic goals.  Since Maastricht the EU has 
become more oriented toward social policy.37  This relatively recent 
focus on social rights contrasts sharply with the ECJ’s original 
emphasis on market freedom.38
In addition to the EU’s expansion of centralized powers over 
member states and its added social dimension, the EU has also 
increased the breadth of its geographic area.  What began as six 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands) has grown in stages to twenty-seven countries, with 
30 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
31 Id. art. 1. 
32 Id. art. 2. 
33 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 
306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
34 Id. art. 2.  
35 Id. art. 3. 
36 See, e.g., SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE (Grainne de Burca & Bruno de 
Witte eds., 2005); STEPHEN C. SIEBERSON, DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES: THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY OF 
LISBON (2008). 
37 Reingard Zimmer, Labour Market Politics through Jurisprudence: 
The Influence of the Judgments of the European Court of Justice (Viking, 
Laval, Rüffert, Luxembourg) on Labour Market Policies, 7 GER. POL’Y STUD.
211, 213 (2011). 
38 See id. at 213–14 (analyzing the changing face of the EU). 
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Croatia scheduled to become the twenty-eighth member state in 
2013.39  The EU is a gargantuan trading bloc with which 
international businesses must be prepared to reckon, not only 
economically, but also with regard to social rights in the employment 
setting.   
III. VIKING ET AL. AND RELEVANT  EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 
A. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION V.
VIKING LINE ABP40
Viking Line ABP, a Finnish company that operated the vessel 
Rosella from Helsinki to Estonia, announced in October 2003 plans 
to reflag the ship to Estonia.41  Paying lower Estonian wages to crew 
members was one way to address the company’s financial 
problems.42  Viking’s collective bargaining agreement with the 
Finnish Seaman’s Union (FSU) expired in November of the same 
year, but FSU took collective action to stop Viking from reflagging 
the vessel.43  The union, determined to stop “social dumping,”44
requested the London-based International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) to ask its members outside of Finland not to 
negotiate with Viking.45  Viking challenged the boycotts in a British 
court46 thereby avoiding the more pro-labor Finnish courts.47
39 From 6 to 27 members, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-27-members/index 
_en.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012); Croatia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-informa 
tion/croatia/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2012). 
40 Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp.Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 
2007 E.C.R. I-10779. 
41 Id. ¶ 6. 
42 Id.
43 Id. ¶ 13. 
44 Social dumping is the importing of laborers from countries with low 
wages to perform services in wealthier countries. 
45 Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 ¶¶ 7–8. 
46 The participants of the British labor union, ITF, vested British courts 
with jurisdiction according to the Brussels Regulation, 44/2001, as amended. 
47 Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 ¶ 22. 
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Viking’s claim was based upon its freedom of establishment 
under European law.48  In a referral action, the ECJ adopted a 
“proportionality” test.  The Court held that although a union has the 
fundamental right to take collective action (the ECJ’s first 
recognition of this right as fundamental), this right is not without 
restriction.  The union has the burden of proving a serious threat of 
job loss to its members and if so, that the collective action is no 
greater than necessary to achieve the intended end.49  Moreover, the 
ECJ held that the national court is the appropriate forum for 
determining whether an alternate dispute mechanism is available at 
the domestic judicial level.50  The decision was criticized as a sudden 
prioritization of the right of establishment over a union’s 
fundamental rights.51
B. LAVAL UN PARTNERI LTD V. SVENSKA 
BYGGNADSARBETAREFÖRBUNDET52
Baltic Bygg was a Latvian subsidiary of another Latvian 
company, Laval.53  All employees of both were also Latvian, and a 
Latvian union maintained a valid collective agreement with Laval 
and its subsidiary.54  Baltic was under contract to refurbish an old 
school in neighboring Sweden.55  The Swedish Building Workers’ 
Union (SBWU) demanded the Latvian employer pay its workers the 
amount payable to Swedish workers, an average of 145Swedish 
krona per hour (U.S. $16.74), two times the amount for which the 
workers had collectively bargained.56  The company refused and 
48 Id. ¶ 7; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 49, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, [hereinafter 
TFEU].   
49 Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 ¶¶ 81–90. 
50 Id.
51 See K.D. EWING, THE INST. OF EMP’T RTS., THE DRAFT MONTI II
REGULATION: AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO VIKING AND LAVAL ¶¶ 4–9 
(2012). 
52 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767. 
53 Id. ¶ 27. 
54 Id. ¶ 28.     
55 Id. ¶ 27. 
56 Id. ¶¶ 30–31. 
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SBWU blockaded the site of the school.57  SBWU’s blockade was 
joined by sympathy picketers, including the Swedish Electricians’ 
Union, effectively preventing ingress and egress, which led Laval to 
ask the Swedish Labor Court to declare the collective action illegal.58
Although the Swedish court refused to grant an injunction,59 it 
forwarded the case to the ECJ for a determination of Swedish law’s 
compliance with the EU Posted Workers Directive (PWD)60 and the 
freedom to provide services. 
The PWD provides that a firm hiring laborers from another 
member state must assure those workers the minimum protections of 
the host country’s law, including minimum rates of pay.61  The 
directive also permits, but does not mandate, that the host company 
adopt policies that will apply to posted workers in cases “of public 
policy provisions.”62  This minimum protection includes conditions 
in national collective bargaining agreements, provided that they are 
“universally applicable.”63
The ECJ again applied the Viking rule of proportionality.64
Further, it construed the PWD as requiring only minimum statutory 
protections, and Sweden has no minimum wage statute.65  Greater 
protections than the minimum are required only when the host 
country can show that collectively bargained terms constitute crucial 
public policy.66  The ECJ held there was no such threat to any 
fundamental interest of society, and that requiring more would go 
beyond the rule of proportionality under Viking.67  On remand, the 
same Swedish Labor Court that had refused to enjoin the unions’ 
boycott applied the ECJ ruling, holding the unions liable to the 
57 Id. ¶ 34. 
58 Id. ¶¶ 38–39. 
59 Arbetsdomstolen [AD] [Labor Court] 2004-12-22 ref A 268/04 
(Swed.).  
60 Directive 96/71/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of 
the Provision of Services, 1997 O.J. (L 018) 1. 
61 Id. art. 3.1(c). 
62 Id. art. 3.10. 
63 Id. art. 3.1, 3.8. 
64 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 94. 
65 Id. ¶ 24. 
66 Id. ¶ 117. 
67 Id. ¶ 119.   
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company in the amount of 2.7 million Swedish krona (U.S. 
$410,965).68
After the decisions in Viking and Laval, the events surrounding a 
labor dispute between the British Airline Pilots Association 
(BALPA) and British Airways (BA) generated claims that the ECJ’s 
holdings had a chilling effect on union collective action.69  In early 
2008, when BA announced plans to establish a French subsidiary in 
order to service more markets, the BALPA voiced concerns that 
lower wages for the subsidiary’s pilots might be used as leverage by 
BA in upcoming talks for a renewed contract.70  When negotiations 
failed, BA voted to strike.71  To preempt any attempt by BA to enjoin 
the strike, BALPA filed a petition for declaratory judgment that the 
planned strike was lawful as proportionate to its interests under 
Viking.72  BA counterclaimed by seeking an injunction and damages 
for an estimated loss of 100 million pound sterling (U.S. $158.4 
million) per day.73  Shortly after a hearing before the High Court but 
prior to a decision, BALPA withdrew its charges in the face of a 
strict deadline.74  Under British statutory law, a vote to strike is valid 
for only four months.75 A lengthy process in the British court system 
could have driven the union into bankruptcy.76
A similar labor dispute occurred on American soil in 2011.  The 
much-publicized controversy between the Boeing Company and 
68 Arbetsdomstolen [AD] [Labor Court] 2009-12-02 ref A 268/04 
(Swed.). 
69 See, e.g., K.D. Ewing & John Hendy, A Tale of Two Cities: 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg and the Rights to Collective Bargaining and to 
Strike, Address at International Conference: The Evolution of Labor Law in 
Europe Under the Pressure of (Neo) Liberal Economics 2–4 (2009), 
available at http://www.terralaboris.be/spip/IMG/doc_Texte_EWI NG_et_ 
HENDY.doc.  
70 Id. at 2. 
71 Id. at 3. 
72 Id.
73 Id. at 5–6. 
74 Id. at 4. 
75 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1992, c. 52, §§ 223–24 
(U.K.). 
76 See generally THE LAVAL AND VIKING CASES: FREEDOM OF SERVICES 
AND ESTABLISHMENT V. INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
AREA AND RUSSIA 172–73 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2009) (detailing a 
chronology of these proceedings). 
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International Association of Machinists (IAM) also involved efforts 
of a powerful union to block a management decision purportedly 
made on economic grounds.  Boeing, headquartered in Seattle, 
Washington, had constructed a $750 million factory in South 
Carolina, where the company planned to build a new line of aircraft: 
the Dreamliner.77  In September 2009, workers at the South Carolina 
plant voted to decertify IAM as their bargaining representative.78
The Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) filed an unfair labor practice action against Boeing79
charging it with coercion of and discrimination against union 
workers.80  The requested remedy, an order that Boeing construct the 
Dreamliners at the Washington plant, rather than in South Carolina, 
77 Tim Devaney, Boeing Opens $750 Million Plant in South Carolina: 
Aerospace Giant Defying National Labor Relations Board’s Complaint,
WASH. TIMES, June 10, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.co 
m/news/2011/jun/10/boeing-opens-750-million-plant-south-carolina/.   
78 Darrin Hoop, Boeing Wins Decert Vote in S.C., 707 SOCIALIST 
WORKER (Oct. 6, 2009), http://socialistworker.org/2009/10/06/boeing-wins-
decert-vote. Some reports incorrectly referred to South Carolina as a “non-
union” state, rather than a right-to-work state, leaving the inference that 
workers were prohibited from joining a union.  (Section 14(b) of the 1947 
amendments to the 1935 Wagner Act permitted states to enact legislation 
making unenforceable a collective bargaining agreement that required union 
membership as a condition of continued employment.  National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (2006).  States with such laws are referred to 
as right-to-work states.) See, e.g., Noel Brinkerhoff & David Wallechinsky, 
Boeing Launches First Non-Union Airplane, ALL GOV (May 07, 2012), 
http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/boeing-launches-first-non-union-
airplane?news=844437.  However, that prohibition is expressly barred by 
federal law.  Norris–LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
79 Brief for Defendant, Boeing v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers District Lodge 751 (N.L.R.B. 2011) (No. 19–CA–
32431);  Hans A. von Spakovsky & James Sherk, National Labor Relations 
Board Overreach Against Boeing Imperils Jobs and Investment, 66 LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found.), May, 11, 2011, at 2, available at 
http://thf_media. s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/lm66.pdf; Steven 
Greenhouse, Labor Board Tells Boeing New Factory Breaks Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/busines 
s/21boeing.html?_r=0. 
80 Von Spakovsky, supra note 83, at 3.  This would constitute a 
violation of federal law.  See Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec. 
101, § 8(a)(1), (3), 61 Stat. 136, 140–41 (1947). 
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provoked political outrage.81 Claiming that Boeing had engaged in an 
unlawful “runaway shop,” the General Counsel was faced with the 
established “but-for” test:  proof that the company’s decision to 
produce the aircraft at the South Carolina plant would not have been 
made but for anti-union animus.82  In determining the lawfulness of 
transferring work to another plant, the NLRB looks to many factors; 
proof of animus alone will not render a decision unlawful if it would 
have been made in the absence of ill will toward the union.83
The company responded that (1) its Washington workers 
suffered neither job losses nor negative employment consequences, 
and customer demand had actually increased production at the main 
plant; (2) “no work [had] been transferred from Washington to South 
Carolina;” and (3) “the decision . . . was made for legitimate 
economic . . . reasons,” including the costly fifty-eight-day IAM 
strike in 2008.84  If the NLRB had received the remedy it requested, 
the effect would have been a de facto closure of the South Carolina 
facility.85
81 See, e.g., Amy Bingham, Obama Breaks Silence About Boeing v. 
NLRB, ABC NEWS (July 19, 2011) available at
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/06/obama-breaks-silence-about-
boeing-v-nlrb.  See also Greenhouse, supra note 80. 
82 See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(discussing the need for anti-union animus). 
83 See, e.g., id.; Robert A. Swift, Plant Relocation: Catching up with the 
Runaway Shop, 14 B.C. L. REV. 1135 (1973) (discussing the proving of the 
runaway shop). 
84 Steven M. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Dreamliner Complaint: a Tangled 
Web of Legal-Political Controversy, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW., 550, 551 (2011) 
(citing George Will, The Dreamliner Nightmare, WASH. POST, May 13, 
2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-
13/opinions/35232327_1_workers-in-washington-state-dreamliners-nlrb); 
Glenn M. Taubman, The NLRB v. Boeing:  Can Unionized Employers 
Expand into Right to Work States?, NEW FED. INITIATIVES (Fed. Soc’y) 
May 26, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publication 
s/detail/print/the-nlrb-vs-boeing-can-unionized-employers-expand-to-right-
to-work-states. 
85 Bernstein, supra note 88, at 551.  Compare Henry Knight with Angie 
Cowan Hamada & Thomas D. Allison, Boeing v. NLRB, ABA SECTION OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW FLASH (ABA Section of Emp’t and Labor 
Law, Chicago, IL) Oct. 2011 (Knight explaining Boeing’s position and 
Cowan &  Allison explaining the NLRB’s position) available at
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Between the hearing before an administrative law judge and his 
decision, the parties settled, and IAM withdrew its charges on 
December 8, 2011.86  Boeing agreed to wage increases and expanded 
production for the Washington employees, and the union withdrew 
its objection to the work at the South Carolina plant proceeding as 
planned.87  Costs arising from the dispute were profligate on both 
sides, and the resulting bitterness led to the introduction of the Job 
Protection Act by Senator Lamar Alexander (R. Tenn.).88  If enacted, 
this law would have amended section 10 of the Taft–Hartley Act to 
expressly strip the NLRB of the power to order or prevent an 
employer from relocating, shutting down, or transferring any existing 
or planned facility.     
How would the Board and the courts have decided this dispute?  
The five-member NLRB decreased to only two members in 
December 2011, and the process might have been in indefinite 
limbo89 because the Supreme Court had previously held that the 
NLRB was void of its statutory powers with fewer than three 
members.90  President Obama appointed three additional members 
during a Congressional recess in January 2012,91 but how or when 
the full Board would have decided Boeing is conjecture.  One 
recognized legal scholar, Rodney Smolla, president of Furman 
University and former dean of law schools at University of 
Richmond and Washington and Lee University, predicted before the 
settlement that the actions of the company would ultimately be 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/11
10_aball_flash/1110_aball_flash_boeing_nlrb.html.  
86 Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB’s Controversial Boeing Case Closed; Lafe 
Solomon Praises ‘Win-Win’ Settlement, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY LAB.
REP.,(237 DLR AA-1, Dec. 9, 2011). 
87 Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After 
Union Reaches Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at B3. 
88 S. 964, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011). 
89 Joseph Williams, President Obama appoints three to NLRB,
POLITICO, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/011 
2/71086.html.  
90 New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (2010).   
91 Williams, supra note 93.   
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deemed protected under both the Constitution and federal labor 
statutes.92
The federal appeals court for the District of Columbia ruled in 
January 2013 that these presidential appointments exceed the power 
of the executive under the recess appointments clause.93  The court 
reasoned that the intra-session break was not a “recess,” or time 
between sessions, during which such power becomes operative.94
The NLRB is expected to appeal this decision; but if it stands, the 
result could be invalidation of all orders of this Board.  NLRB 
Chairman Mark Pearce’s opinion that the appellate court’s decision
“applies only to one specific case”95 is not shared by many prominent 
labor attorneys, including G. Roger King.  On February 13, 2013, 
Mr. King testified on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America and the Coalition for a Democratic 
Workplace before a congressional committee that this ruling would 
nullify the nearly one thousand Board decisions made since the 
expiration of the former chairman’s term on August 27, 2011.96   
C. RÜFFERT V. LAND NIEDERSACHSEN97
A Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) state law in Germany required 
all companies with public construction contracts in the amount of 
10,000 Euro (U.S. $16,212) or more to pay workers the wages in the 
construction sector collective bargaining agreement, a commitment 
92 Rod Smolla, Analysis: Legal scholar deconstructs Boeing case,
CHARLESTON REGIONAL BUS. J., Nov. 21, 2011, available at http://www.ch 
arlestonbusiness.com/news/41851/print.  
93 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
94 Noel Canning v. NLRB Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024 
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).    
95 Statement by Chairman Pearce on Recess Appointment Ruling,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov-news-statement-
chairman-pearce-recess-appoinment-ruling (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
96 The Future of the NLRB: What Noel Canning v. NLRB Means for 
Workers, Employers, and Unions, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. 
and Workforce Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions,
113th Cong. 11 (2013) (testimony of G. Roger King, Counsel, Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States and Coalition for a Democratic Workplace), 
available at  http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/Futureoft 
heNLRB-NoelCanningTestimony-21313.pdf. 
97 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989. 
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that also attached to subcontractors.98  One subcontractor paid its 
fifty-three Polish workers less than half the union contract amount, 
and the government terminated the agreement.99  When the main 
contractor went into liquidation, the receiver, Rüffert, petitioned a 
German court to award an amount available for creditors’ losses 
sustained from the terminated contract.100  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) upheld the 
law and held against the petitioner, but referred to the ECJ the 
question of compliance with European law addressing cross-border 
services.101
The Court applied the PWD as construed in Laval, holding that 
the union contract did not meet the “universally applicable” test for 
two reasons: First, the Bundestag (German legislature) had adopted a 
law specifying the means in which a collective bargaining agreement 
could be rendered universally applicable,102 and this procedure had 
not been followed.103 Second, the state law applied only to public 
contracts.104
The law in Rüffert is indistinguishable from a long-standing 
statute in the United States, the Davis–Bacon Act (Davis–Bacon).105
Despite the absence of any express mention of collectively-bargained 
wages in the American law, the act has impacted them by aligning 
the prevailing wage in highly unionized sectors with the union 
contract.106  Davis–Bacon stemmed from lawmakers’ post-
Depression concerns that black workers were underpaid.107  This law 
requires private companies engaged in contracts with the federal 
government for $2000 or more to pay the locality’s prevailing wage 
in the particular industry, as determined by the Secretary of Labor.108
98 Id. ¶¶ 29–30. 
99 Id. ¶ 37. 
100 Id. ¶ 3. 
101 See id. ¶ 136; see also TFEU, supra note 49. 
102 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 25, 1969, 
TARIFVERTRAGSGESETZ I [TVG] 1323, § 5. 
103 Rüffert, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989 ¶ 27. 
104 Id. ¶¶ 27–33. 
105 40 U.S.C. §§ 3144–3148 (2006). 
106 See id.; Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the 
Rise in American Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 518–19 (2011).
107 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/highway 
history/road/s13.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).  
108 See 40 U.S.C. §§ 3144–3148.  
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It has not been repealed or amended, and in light of Davis–Bacon, 
the U.S. courts would likely have approved a statute such as that in 
Rüffert.
D. COMMISSION V. LUXEMBOURG109
The Luxembourg Parliament enacted a law mandating that 
companies hiring non-domestic workers comply with “public policy 
provisions” in that industry’s union contract that covered the entire 
country.  The European Commission (EC) challenged the legality of 
this law under the PWD.  In order to meet the “public policy” 
element, the EC required Luxembourg to prove that non-enforcement 
would pose a serious threat to a fundamental societal interest.  Not 
only was this burden not met, but the ECJ added that a collective 
bargaining agreement applicable to all companies in a sector did not 
constitute “public policy.”110
Summarizing the issues in the four cases, it is significant that 
Articles 43 and 49 of the TFEU and the PWD were the only 
provisions in the vast body of European law that the ECJ was asked 
to address.  The jurisdiction of the ECJ is substantially limited by the 
treaties such as the EC Treaty, which establish the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the supra-national ECJ.111  Except for one Article 226 
case (Luxembourg),112 the other cases were all Article 234 referral 
109 Case C-319/06, Comm’n v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2008
E.C.R. I-04323. 
110 Id.
111 The two most frequent types of cases heard by the ECJ are those 
filed under Article 226 (formerly Article 169) in which the European 
Commission challenges a member state for non-compliance with EU law, 
and Article 234 (formerly Article 177), the referral provision, in which a 
national court requests a decision on compatibility of domestic law with EU 
law.  Less frequently, the Court might hear a member state challenge the 
Commission under Article 230 (formerly Article 173), alleging that one of 
the EU law-making bodies has acted beyond its granted authority.  An 
Article 230 charge is sometimes described as a “reverse Article 226” case.  
Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
arts. 226, 230, 234, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 125 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty]. 
112 Comm’n v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2008 E.C.R. I-4323; see
supra Part III.D. 
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cases.113  The ECJ is exclusively limited to considering and applying 
EU law.114
IV. SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIVE AND PROPOSED REGULATION
EU statutory law comes in two forms:  regulations and 
directives.  While both a regulation and directive are directly 
enforceable in all member states, directives are more commonly 
used.  Directives mandate that member states achieve a designated 
result prior to a prescribed date by implementation of their own 
chosen mechanism under domestic law.115  The directive has no 
counterpart in American law. 
The Services Directive,116 known as the Bolkestein Directive, is 
also relevant, as would be the proposed Monti II regulation if it had 
been adopted.  Similar to popular names for U.S. statutes, these titles 
indicate their respective proponents: Frederick “Fritz” Bolkestein of 
the Netherlands, the former Commissioner for the Internal Market, 
and Mario Monti, the current Prime Minister of Italy. 
A. THE SERVICES DIRECTIVE (“BOLKESTEIN”)
The Bolkestein Directive aims to apply the EU’s “country of 
origin” rule for goods to services as well.  This principle assures that 
“goods produced in [any member state] can be sold in any other 
[member state].”117 The principle has been maligned by labor as 
instigating a downward spiral for labor standards and strongly 
criticized as a tacit approval of social dumping.118  A substantially 
altered version of the Bolkestein Directive was finally approved.119
113 See supra Part III.A–C. 
114 See Treaty of Lisbon supra note 34, at 19–22. 
115 Id.
116 Directive 2006/123/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. 
(L 376) 36.   
117 Simon Basketter, Bolkestein: the monster haunting Europe,
SOCIALIST WORKER (Jan. 24, 2006), http://www.socialistworker.co/printart.p 
hp?ed=8072. 
118 Id.
119 Declaration of Euro. Trade Union Confederation, Declaration on the 
Commission proposals for a Monti II Regulation and Enforcement Directive 
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The country of origin principle is not expressly included, but the 
language of the directive reminds member states of the doctrine of 
free movement by introducing a mutual-recognition rule in order to 
harmonize consumer protections while simultaneously maintaining a 
high quality of services.120
B. THE PROPOSED MONTI II REGULATION
If it had been adopted, Monti II would have refined the PWD in 
an effort to achieve a balance between facilitating cross-border 
services and protecting posted workers.121  However, advocates for 
organized labor were displeased with Monti II, deeming it at best 
inadequate and at worst an enforcement of the court-imposed 
restrictions on trade union activity in Viking and Laval.122  The 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) unequivocally 
renounced the draft because it (1) maintained the limits on workers’ 
collective action right; (2) strengthened Viking’s proportionality test; 
and (3) did not recognize social rights as having a priority over 
economic freedoms.123  Professor of Public Law at Kings College 
London, K.D. Ewing, also chastised the drafters of Monti II for 
deferring to national courts124 in determining whether planned union 
action is suitable to achieve its objectives.125  He found this 
particularly problematic in countries without specialized labor courts, 
where such matters are decided by commercial courts with no 
experience in labor law.126   
Whatever effect Monti II would have had is now moot.  On 
September 11, 2012, the European  Committee for Employment and 
Social Affairs announced the withdrawal of the proposed 
of the Posted Workers Directive (Apr. 19, 2012) [hereinafter ETUC 
Declaration], available at http://etuc.org/a/9917.    
120 Id.
121 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to 
Take Collective Action Within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment 
and the Freedom to Provide Services, at 10, COM (2012) 130 final (Mar. 21, 
2012). 
122 ETUC Declaration, supra note 124. 
123 Id.
124 See EWING, supra note 52. 
125 Id. at 13–14. 
126 Id. at 14. 
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regulation.127  This marked the first time the “yellow-card” procedure 
added by the Treaty of Lisbon128 was used.129  If at least one-third of 
the EU member states are of the opinion that proposed legislation is 
contrary to the subsidiarity principle, they can collectively “flag” the 
proposed law, triggering a procedure that mandates review by the 
EC.  The principle of subsidiarity originated in the Treaty of Rome 
that established the European Community.130  This cardinal rule of 
European law provides that the EU will not act in areas where the 
national lawmaking bodies are best suited to rule.  Further, the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)131 expressly states 
that the EU will defer to member states on the regulation of the right 
to strike.132  Thus, despite the leviathan of power that European law 
holds over its member states, the subsidiarity principle and the 
fledgling “yellow card” procedure illustrate some limits to that 
power. 
V. ILO CONVENTIONS AND PROVISIONS OF EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL CHARTER
Much of the criticism railed against the ECJ has stemmed from 
the incongruity of Viking and its successor decisions with the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) guarantees of freedom of 
association and the right to organize133 as well as the right of workers 
to bargain collectively.134  Most EU member states are also parties to 
127 Brussels Drops Plans for EU Law Limiting Right to Strike,
EURACTIV.COM, http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/ec-drops-regulation-
right-strike-news-514793 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).  
128 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 34, Protocol no. 1, art.,  Protocol no. 2, 
art. 7.2. 
129 The European Commission Gets Its First “Yellow Card”,
LANDESORGANISATIONEN I DANMARK, http://www.lo.dk/English%2 
0version/News/yellowcard.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
130 Treaty of Rome, supra note 25, art. 5.   
131 TFEU, supra note 49.   
132 Id.
133 See EWING, supra note 52. 
134 See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, ILO No. 98, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (July 18, 1951).  See 
also ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, ILO No. 87 (July 9, 1948). 
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the two ILO Conventions.135  Similarly, EU member states share 
common membership in the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)136 and the 1961 European Social Charter (ESC).137
The ECHR guarantees freedom of association138 and the ESC, as 
revised in 1996, expressly recognizes the workers’ right to strike.139
Moreover, some legal academics view ECHR case law as 
recognizing a general right to work.140  Finally, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes the right to 
strike,141  made binding on EU member states by the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009.142  This obligation under the Treaty of Lisbon might have 
presented the most compelling argument against the ECJ’s decisions 
in Viking and Laval had its obligatory status not post-dated the 
decisions.  
An American company on its home turf is not faced with a 
multi-national oligarchy over the federal government like companies 
in EU member states.  Although European law holds priority over the 
national laws of member states,143 the latest stance of the ECJ 
restricting collective rights of workers is a welcome respite for the 
international business from the more usual protection of workers in 
Europe.144  Nonetheless, if Monti II is revised in accordance with 
pro-union demands, this might be short-lived. 
135Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last updated 
Sept. 17, 2012). 
136 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
137 European Social Charter (revised), May 3, 1996, E.T.S. No. 163, art. 
11(1) [hereinafter Social Charter]. 
138 See ECHR, supra note 138, art. 11(1). 
139 See Social Charter, supra note 139, art. 6(4). 
140 See, e.g., Rory O’Connell, The Right to Work in the ECHR, 2 EUR.
HUM. RTS L. REV. 176 (2012). 
141 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 34, art. 28. 
142 Id. art. 156.  Protocol 10/09 permitted Poland and the United 
Kingdom (and subsequently the Czech Republic) to opt out of ECJ 
jurisdiction over issues arising under the Charter. 
143 See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
144 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Traditionally, domestic laws in European countries with their 
combined labor-social legislation have been considerably more 
labor-friendly than in the United States.  The employment-at-will 
laws of many American states are alien to European law; European 
lawyers and law students may have difficulty grasping the 
unemployment concepts of “available for work” and “actively 
seeking work” as prerequisites to eligibility of unemployment 
compensation.  Moreover, European workers have substantial annual 
paid-leaves and lengthy compensated maternity and paternal 
leaves.145  This contrasts starkly with the unpaid twelve weeks 
provided only for employees who meet the work time provisions of 
the FMLA.146
The BALPA dispute evidences the impact of Viking and its 
progeny, but the demise of Monti II has prohibited any legislative 
confirmation of the judiciary’s limitations on workers’ collective 
rights.  In contrast, federal legislation in the United States specifying 
mandatory subjects of bargaining would be unlikely to include a 
management decision to import laborers to do specified contract 
work within the concept of “terms and conditions.”  The ECJ’s 
limitation on unions’ right to interfere with a business’ right to 
establishment altered the European labor-management legal 
environment to closer resemble the structure of U.S. statutory law, at 
least temporarily. 
The cases examined in this article provide a comparative look at 
EU law in an area significant to businesses engaged in trade within 
Europe.  EU countries are not only heavily unionized, but also have 
concomitant domestic and international social obligations under EU, 
ECHR, and ESC treaties.  The international company and its counsel 
must understand the relative bargaining strengths and restrictions of 
management and labor unions imposed by these various transnational 
laws. 
145 See supra discussion at Part I. 
146 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
